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chapter III).  This distinction underscores the lack of
legitimate civil and political (in the broad sense) order
in the former world, where “society has completely
disappeared” (17; Part I, chapter I).  Here, Sarmiento
focuses on the anarchic and, in his words, “feudal”
aspects of the only “society” there is, the family,
whose structure is analogously tyrannical.
13. See, for example, Facundo, 17-18, Part I, chapter I,
where Sarmiento characterizes the socioeconomic
organization of “barbarism” as “similar to the feudalism
of the Middle Ages” but without barons and castles.
14. Facundo Quiroga is, for Sarmiento, the incarnation of
the primitive barbarian type (see, for example,
Facundo, 51; Part II, chapter I).  He is “the natural man
who has not yet learned to control or disguise his
passions; who displays them in all their energy, giving
himself to its impetuousness.”  He is lawless and
hateful of authority, hard-hearted and “dominated by
rage.”  Later on in Facundo, however, Sarmiento
tempers his judgment: he claims that Quiroga was
not cruel or bloodthirsty but rather simply “the
barbarian” (el barbaro) who knows not how to restrain
his passions and who, upon having his passions
aroused, knows not how to measure his responses to
them.  But he proceeds to call him a “terrorist” (el
terrorista), who, upon entering a city, executes (fusila)
some and assaults (azota) the other, brutalizing
women and humiliating citizens.  Here is an example
of why Sarmiento has been called “the essence of
contradiction”!  Perhaps, in this context, it is better to
think of his judgment as reflecting his ambiguity
toward the figure of the gaucho and even of the
gaucho turned caudillo.  He does seem to have some
respect for this character, to the extent that he is self-
assured, brave, vital, and free.  The problem is that
these traits in barbarians are feral and uncontrolled.
15. I would argue that Sarmiento is an environmentalist
but not a determinist.  First, his language when
referring to the relationship between environment
and character supports a weak determinism at best
(see, for example, Facundo, 16, Part I, chapter I, where
he says that the way of life of the countryside is what
“influences” [influye] the formation of the “barbarian”
character and spirit).  In the same chapter,  Sarmiento
examines other factors that contribute to the
formation of the “barbarian” spirit, notably the social
(or, rather, asocial) organization of life and the feudal
economic organization (see also the Introduction,
where Sarmiento contends that both “colonialism”
and the peculiarities of the geographical environment
are responsible for shaping the “barbarian” character).
So, I would argue that geographical environment, for
Sarmiento, is a contributing cause but does not
overdetermine the formation of character.   Second,
Sarmiento’s whole project of “civilizing” the
“barbarian” world would be self-defeating in the
extreme if he believed that environment alone
determines one’s character.  The geography will not
ever change, but the ways of organizing life, given
geography, can be changed so that the unity of the
nation through civilization can become a reality.
Similarly, Sarmiento’s almost obsessive concern with
education would be pointless if he were a strong
determinist because if character is wholly formed by
nature, then there is nothing that education can do to
change and improve it.  I am aware that this issue is
larger and more complex than these brief arguments
can address, but, again, space constrains what I can
do in this paper.  For an argument that Sarmiento is a
strong determinist, see Susana Nuccetelli. Latin
American Thought: Philosophical Problems and
Arguments (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 166-
73.
16. At times, Sarmiento portrays the “barbarian” (gaucho
or caudillo) as inflamed by a sense of “superiority.”
But this superiority is spurious and, he suggests, simply
a very human response to the need not to feel
completely helpless in the face of the stringent
demands of the environment.  Interestingly, the
“symbols” of this “superiority” are themselves
“barbarian” and what render this character an object
of fear rather than admiration: the knife, the bolas,
and the physical prowess and endurance
demonstrated through command of the horse.  These
symbols represent the potential violence  of
“barbarism” as the rule of brute force.
17. Sarmiento has faith in the possibility of progress, but
not the unlimited faith of nineteenth-centur y
positivists who viewed progress as inevitable.  In fact,
for Sarmiento, General Rosas and his “barbarian” rule
is proof that regression is a very real possibility in the
life of Hispanoamerican nations.  In this sense,
Facundo is a warning: tyranny will become a
permanent reality in the life of the new nations unless
combated actively with the “instruments” of progress,
notably the constitutional rule of law and policies
aimed at mental and material development (viz.,
education, immigration, the development of
technological structure and industry/commerce, and
so on).
18. For illuminating discussions of various aspects of
Sarmiento’s “program” of social reform, see the
excellent collection of articles in Sarmiento: Author
of A Nation, edited by T. Halperin Donghi, I. Jaksic, G.
Kirkpatrick, and F. Masiello (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1994).
19. See, for example, “Our America.”  In Jose Marti:
Selected Writings, edited by E. Allen, with Introduction
by R. Gonzalez Echevarria (New York: Penguin, 2002).
20. For a discussion of Sarmiento’s views on this issue,
see, for example, William Katra, “Rereading Viajes:
Race, Identity, and National Destiny,” and Natalio
Botana, “Sarmiento and Political Order: Liberty, Power,
and Virtue,” both in Sarmiento: Author of a Nation,
73-100 and 101-13, respectively.
For both invaluable discussion and comments on a draft of
this paper, I thank James Cane-Carrasco and Michael
Monahan.




The intellectual history of Latin America is replete with
attempts to address the question of whether there is, or can
be, Latin American philosophy.  While there have been
numerous and varied answers to the question from a wide
range of gifted thinkers, there has been relatively little
engagement with the question as such.  José Mariátegui,
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Leopoldo Zea, and Risieri Frondizi, just to name a few, have
provided their respective answers to the question, but they
have not questioned the question itself.1  What are the reasons
behind it?  Why is it important?  What are the conditions under
which we understand it to be a legitimate question in the first
place?  In short, what motivates the question and gives it force?
On its face, the question “Is there Latin American
philosophy” can be understood in two distinct, though
interrelated, ways.  The first is a relatively empirical question,
concerned with the presence (or lack thereof) of philosophical
production in Latin America and/or by Latin Americans.  In
order to answer this question, it is necessary to have some
clear concept of the geographical borders of Latin America,
and/or the constitution of the group of Latin Americans.  To be
sure, neither of these concepts have been settled definitively,
and, what is more, one would need some working definition
of philosophy, which can itself be quite a chore.  Nevertheless,
once one has settled on some use for the terms “Latin
American” and “philosophy,” the first interpretation of the
question “Is there Latin American philosophy” becomes strictly
empirical.
This will be true whether one is a universalist about
philosophy or not.  If one holds the universalist position that all
philosophical endeavor is the same in some foundational
sense, then one need only ask whether the intellectual product
in question really is philosophy, and, if so, whether it was
produced by a Latin American (understood either in the strictly
geographical sense of being a person in or from Latin America,
or, perhaps, understood in an ethnic sense).  If the answer to
both these questions is “yes,” then there is Latin American
philosophy, at least in this particular case.  At the same time, if
one rejects the universalist position and holds that philosophy
is, in some deep sense, historical, or culturally relevant, or
some other variation on this theme, then the basic method
remains the same.  The only real difference will be that the
nonuniversalist will hold that Latin American philosophy might
not look exactly the same as British, French, or North American
philosophy.
The nonuniversalist position leads into the second
interpretation of the question of Latin American philosophy.
Instead of asking the empirical question of the production of
philosophy in Latin America and/or by Latin Americans, the
question can be interpreted to ask whether there is or can be
philosophy that is peculiarly Latin American.  This is clearly a
more compelling question for nonuniversalists, who would
allow for the existence of a culturally specific philosophy.  If
one is a strict universalist, the answer to the question becomes
obvious, as there can only be philosophy simpliciter—it is
meaningless to ask whether there is a specifically Latin
American philosophy if one is a strict universalist.  Nevertheless,
there could be a variety of universalist for whom this could
remain a viable question.  One might be a “weak universalist”
and hold that, while the fundamental concepts and questions
(and probably methodology) of philosophy are universal, there
are culturally specific differences of style and content.  All
philosophy, from this perspective, is the same at its root, but
there are important culturally relative flourishes and more
“superficial” distinctions that allow for a kind of culturally
specific philosophy even within a more broadly “universalist”
framework.
In either case, part of the question, on this interpretation,
is whether there is anything distinctive about the philosophy
generated in Latin America (or by Latin Americans) vis-à-vis
Europe and North America.  Indeed, much of the concern in
the historical literature on the question has to do with the
extent to which philosophy in Latin America is or is not
derivative of European philosophy.  Any affirmative answer to
the question of Latin American philosophy, in this latter sense
of cultural specificity, must, therefore, be understood to entail
some relevant differences between Latin American philosophy
on the one hand and European/North American philosophy
on the other.
Furthermore, there is a counterfactual concern for both
interpretations of the basic question.  That is, even if the
immediate answer is that there is no Latin American
philosophy at present (perhaps because it is derivative of
European philosophy, or because intellectual production in
Latin America is not yet properly philosophical, etc.), there
remains the question of whether there could be Latin American
philosophy in the future.  Here, the issue of distinctiveness
from  Europe remains critical even if there is no such
distinctiveness at present.
What interests me most, however, is what lurks behind
the question of Latin American philosophy.  One way to
approach this is by asking why there wasn’t a corresponding
concern in nineteenth-century North America. That is, why
weren’t there massive amounts of journalistic and
philosophical essays, congresses, conferences, and so on,
dedicated to putting to rest once and for all “the question of
North American philosophy?”  The immediate response to this
latter question is to point out that there was no question of
North American philosophy in the same way that Latin
American philosophy has been presented as a question.  Ralph
Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, Charles Sanders Pierce,
and William James were all convinced that they were doing
something distinctive and unorthodox.  They also understood
themselves to be citizens of the United States, which, in turn,
made their distinctive philosophy “American.”  Thus, there
was some sense in which they understood their philosophy to
be American, but this was not understood by them, or by the
intellectual community at large, to be an earth-shattering
revelation.  It did not reveal the full promise of North American
peoples nor did it establish the legitimacy of intellectual
endeavor in the United States.   It was a curiosity—a new and
novel approach to philosophy that took root in the United
States, nothing more or less.
From this history, a new question emerges.  Why is Latin
American philosophy understood to be a question in the first
place?  I have two interrelated approaches to this problem,
both of which are offered more as invitations to further
discussion than as definitive answers.2  First, in Latin America,
for numerous reasons, there was a concerted effort (though,
certainly, this effort was stronger and more successful at
different times and in different places) to expunge Spanish
and/or European intellectual, cultural, and political influence.
In the United States, on the other hand, the concern was to
avoid the political influence and control of Britain, but North
Americans were perfectly happy to preserve much of British
culture, including its philosophical tradition.  Thus, raising the
“question” of Latin American philosophy might be part of an
effort to establish a radical break with Spain (and by extension,
Europe) by creating a distinct and original intellectual tradition
over and against Spain/Europe.  “To the extent that our
philosophy remains European, we remain intellectually
colonized,” the argument might go.  “And if our philosophy is
distinctively Latin American, that signals the breaking of those
mental fetters.”
Another possible motive behind the question of Latin
American philosophy has to do with mestizaje and the politics
of race.  In North America, there was not the same degree of
mestizaje.  The indigenous peoples were either exterminated
or confined to reservations, and the African population likewise
remained (relatively) distinct.  As a consequence, it was much
easier for North Americans to see themselves, and be seen by
— Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy —
— 17 —
Europe, as culturally, intellectually, and racially European.  For
Europeans, North America might have been a distant backwater,
and its inhabitants might have been poor relations, but they
were still relations.  Because of the extent of mestizaje, the
same could not be said for Latin America.  The inhabitants of
Latin America, even the Criollo elite, were understood (by
Europeans, and, perhaps equally importantly, by North
Americans) to be culturally and racially distinct from Europe/
Spain.  Within this racialized framework, the intellectual
capacity—the rationality—of the non-European is understood
to be always already in question.  In this situation, one way to
establish one’s legitimacy as a rational agent is to produce
what is incontrovertibly philosophy.  This can be done either
in the same tradition as Europe (thereby showing that the
racial classification as nonrational is mistaken), or as something
completely new (thereby establishing racial equivalence, or
even superiority, á la José Vasconcelos).  Either way, it becomes
crucial that the intellectual prowess of those whose capacity
is in doubt (within a racialized framework) be proven on the
philosophical field of battle.
What all of this points toward is the extent to which the
purpose behind the question of Latin American philosophy is
so crucial to positing any answer to that question.  “Is there a
Latin American philosophy?” is a way of asking whether there
is anything distinctive about Latin America.  It is a way of asking
whether there is any coherence to the notion of Latin America
itself, and it is a way of asking about the identity of Latin
American peoples.  If we think of British philosophy, for
example, we can see all of these functions at play.  British
philosophy, provided one understands it to be in any way
culturally specific (either as a “weak” universalist, or as an
historicist), has to be more than simply the philosophy
produced by citizens of the British Isles.  Describing a particular
philosopher (John Locke) or a particular philosophy
(Utilitarianism) as “British” is a way of establishing something
distinctively British about that philosopher or philosophy.
Pointing out their shared British-ness, likewise, is a way of
pointing out the coherence of Britain itself.  And British
philosophers and philosophy both inform British identity and
are, in turn, informed by it.
The same exercise can be performed in relation to
European philosophy generally.  What becomes particularly
clear in this context, however, is the extent to which much of
the unity and coherence of European philosophy arises not
exclusively out of any similarities as such but as much, if not
more, out of a distinction from the non-European.  Just as the
notion of Europe itself resulted from the encounter with Africa
and the “New World” (the radically non-European), we can
see how particular varieties of European philosophy (German,
British, French) are understood as such in part as an effort to
establish difference from some other variety(ies).  In other
words, what makes European philosophy coherently European
is in large part its difference from Asian philosophy, African
philosophy, and so on.
In the Latin American context, much of the reason the
question of Latin American philosophy took on such
importance was because it was a way not only to establish
Latin American rationality but also Latin American identity.  “Is
there a Latin American philosophy?” is a way of drawing a
distinction between what is Latin American and what is not.  It
is an attempt to draw some coherent whole in relation to
some relevant other (Spain, Europe, North America, etc.). Thus,
it may very well be that if we are even asking the question of
Latin American philosophy, we already have some notion of
what it isn’t, and we are really just negotiating what we want it
to be.
Thus, much of the shape of Latin American philosophy is
determined by the way in which this question is asked.  In
raising the question itself, one is shaping philosophical
endeavor in Latin America.  Just as our understanding of British
philosophy emerges out of the practice of philosophy in Britain,
Latin American philosophy can only emerge in a similar way.
The answer to the question is, in effect, dictated by the prior
notions of philosophy, of Latin America itself, and of its
distinctiveness (or lack thereof) from Europe and North
America that we bring with us.  Thus, it is only in investigating
the motives behind the question that we can ever make
progress on the question itself.  And, what is more, in asking
these deeper questions about motive, and the nature of
philosophy, and the ontological status of Latin America and
Latin Americans, we are most certainly asking philosophical
questions.  So it may very well be that the question provides
its own answer in the course of being asked.
Endnotes
1. José Mariátegui. “Is There Such a Thing as Hispanic-
American Thought?” In The Heroic and Creative
meaning of Socialism: Selected Essays of José Carlos
Mariátegui, edited by M. Peralman (Atlantic Highlands,
NJ: Humanities Press, 1996); Leopoldo Zea. “The
Actual Function of Philosophy in Latin America.” In
Latin American Philosophy for the 21st Century: The
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edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia and Elizabeth Millán-
Zaibert (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 2004), 357-68;
and Risieri Frondizi. “Is There an Ibero-American
Philosophy?” In Latin American Philosophy: An
Introduction with Readings , edited by Susana
Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 2004) 294-301.
2. What follows came about as a result of discussions
with William Cooper and Maria Morales at the NEH
Summer Institute on Latin American Philosophy in
June of 2005.  Any mistakes, misrepresentations, or
other failings are solely my responsibility.
DISCUSSION
On the Advantage and Disadvantage of the
History of Philosophy for Latin American
Philosophers
Renzo Llorente
Saint Louis University, Madrid Campus
I.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Latin American
philosophy is still by and large viewed with indifference by
professional philosophers.  Worse still, in the opinion of many
who are well acquainted with the work of Latin American
philosophers, the pervasive indifference toward Latin
American philosophy is not unwarranted, for this tradition is
characterized by thought that is, on the whole, derivative and
unoriginal.  As Jorge J. E. Gracia, a philosopher who has written
extensively on Latin American philosophy, puts it,
